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An important and traditional power afforded by the Bankruptcy Code to debtors and
trustees is the power to sell encumbered property free and clear of any liens or encumbrances.
See G COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, App. Pt. 44, at 44-529 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed.
rev. 2006). One way in which this power is given to debtors and trustees is through Section
363(f)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides a mechanism for property to be sold free and
clear of any liens. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2006). Yet, the application of Section 363(f)(3) is
not entirely clear from the language of the statute, and a split has been created among courts
which interpret the statute in different ways. See G COLLIER, supra, at 44-530. The following
discussion outlines the application of Section 363(f)(3), first discussing the statute itself, then
discussing the two approaches to the statute, and finally examining the practical consequences of
each interpretation.

I. OUTLINE OF SECTION 363(f)(3) AND THE PROBLEM IN INTERPRETATION
A party may sell property free and clear of any liens if it meets any one of the five
conditions outlined in 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3). See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3); G COLLIER, supra, at 44529. One way in which a party may sell property free and clear of liens is if that party meets the
requirements outlined in Section 363(f)(3). 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) provides: “The trustee may sell
property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in such property
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of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . (3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(f)(3).
The purpose of the statute is to allow properties sold in bankruptcy to generate higher
prices, while still protecting the lienholder. See G COLLIER, supra, at 44-529. The logic behind
the higher sales price can easily be inferred: an individual will likely be willing to pay more for a
property if that individual is aware that he or she will then own that property free and clear of
any prior liens. Yet, the lienholder is, or remains, protected because it receives compensation for
its lien from the sale proceeds. See id. Furthermore, the lienholder retains the option of “credit
bidd[ing] on the property by bidding in some or all of the value of its lien against the property of
the debtor.” See id.
Despite the clear purpose of the statute, the wording of the statute has caused some
confusion among courts. See id. at 44-530. While the language of Section 363(f)(3) seems clear
at first, the phrase “the aggregate value of all liens,” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(3), has caused confusion
and has resulted in two different interpretations of the statute. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, ¶
363.06[4][a], at 363-52 (Alan N. Resnick et al. eds., 15th ed. rev. 2006); G COLLIER, supra, at
44-530
Some courts interpret the language in question to mean the “face value” of the liens. See
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW), 391 B.R. 25, 39–40 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008).
Thus, this interpretation allows a sale free and clear under Section 363(f)(3) only if the sale
yields an amount greater than the total amount of all the claims on the property. See id. at 41.
Conversely, other courts interpret the phrase to mean the “economic value” of the liens.
See id. at 39–40. A property may be sold free and clear of any liens if the property sells for an
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amount which is greater than the “economic value” of all the liens on the property. See In re
Terrace Gardens Park P’ship, 96 B.R. 707, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989). Thus, this
interpretation allows a sale free and clear of liens under Section 363(f)(3) if the sale yields an
amount greater than the value of the liens on the property after they have been discounted to their
economic value, even if this value is less than the face value of all the liens.

II. THE 363(f)(3) SPLIT
As discussed above, there are two different views which courts take when determining
whether a property may be sold free and clear under Section 363(f)(3). The following is a
discussion delineating the reasoning of the courts on either side of the split.
A. Courts which interpret “value” to mean the “economic value” of all the liens
Courts which interpret the phase “the aggregate value of all liens” to mean economic
value rely chiefly on the language of the statute in reference to its context within the Code and
the purpose of the statute. See 3 COLLIER, ¶ 363.06[4][a], supra, at 363-52. These courts note
that the word “value” is found in other areas within the code and note that the purpose of the
statute would be frustrated if it required property to be sold in excess of the “face value” of all
the liens. See id.
For instance, in In re Beker Industries Corporation, 63 B.R. 474 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986),
the court noted that other sections of the Code also use the word “value” in ways comparable to
section 363(f)(3). See id. at 475. Beker involved a bankruptcy proceeding in which a debtor
sought to sell his property free and clear of liens under § 363(f). Id. However, it was clear that
the property would not be able to sell for an amount greater than the “face value” of all the liens.
Id. Sale of the property was postponed so that the Beker court could interpret the meaning of
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Section 363(f)(3). Id. Thus, the question before the court was whether the property could be sold
free and clear of the liens if the property sold for an amount greater than the economic value of
the liens, but not the face value of the liens. See id.
The court in Beker concluded that the word “value” meant the “economic value” of the
liens. See id. at 476. The Beker court relied primarily on 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), where the word
“value” is used in a way comparable to Section 363(f)(3). See id. at 575–76. Section 506(a) is a
provision which allows a bankruptcy court to take a secured creditors lien and separate it into
two different liens, one secured and one unsecured. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) note (2006)
(Historical and Statutory Notes). The secured creditor will remain secured up to the “economic
value” of the property; the remaining amount of his claim, namely, the amount adding up to the
“face value,” will become unsecured. See id. Thus, the Beker court concluded, it would be
consistent with the use of the word “value” in section 506(a), to read the word “value” in section
363(f)(3) as the “economic value” of the lien. See Beker, 63 B.R. at 476.
The Beker court dismissed what seemed to be a contrary intent that could be gleaned
from congressional records. See id. The Beker court did so by giving primacy to the language of
the statute itself, and the use of the word “value” in other places throughout the Bankruptcy
Code. See id. As a brief final point in its Section 363(f)(3) discussion, the Beker court referenced
the ability to sell property free and clear of liens pursuant to Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) of the
Bankruptcy Code, without having to sell the property in an amount greater than the face value of
all the liens. See In re Beker, 63 at 477; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). Thus, the
Beker court interpreted the word “value” in Section 363(f)(3) to mean only the “economic value”
of the liens. See In re Beker, 63 at 476.
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Another example of a court which concluded that “value,” as used in Section 363(f)(3),
meant “economic value” is In re Terrace Gardens Park Partnership, 96 B.R. 707 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex.1989), a decision which added further clarity and support to the Beker decision. Terrace
Gardens is a somewhat intricate case involving an office building complex. Id. at 708. The
debtor in the case amassed a debt in excess of the value of its property secured by a senior and
junior lien. Id. at 709–10. The debtor sought to sell two of the buildings in the complex free and
clear of the liens as part of its plan of reorganization. Id. at 708. While the debtor was able to
arrange for the sale of the buildings at a rate that was greater than the court determined market
value of the buildings, the sale would not be greater than the face value of the liens. Id. at 710–
11. The question before the court was whether the debtor could sell the two buildings free and
clear of any liens notwithstanding the fact that the sale would not equal the face value of the
liens. Id. at 713.
The court in Terrace Gardens, further clarified and supported the Beker decision while
expressly agreeing with the Beker court’s rationale, and concluded that “value,” as used in
Section 363(f)(3), meant “economic value.” See id. As in Beker, the Terrace Gardens court
examined Section 363(f)(3) via an examination of its context. See id. It noted that the underlying
focus of Sections 361-364 is on adequate protection of the creditor’s interest. See id. With
adequate protection as the focus, defining “value” as “face value” would interpret Section
363(f)(3) in a way inconsistent with the surrounding sections. See id. Thus, in light of the
surrounding statutes and their underlying focus, the Terrace Gardens court held that “value”
means “economic value” and allowed the buildings to be sold free and clear of liens. See id.
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B. Courts which interpret “value” to mean the “face value” of all the liens
Courts which interpret “value” to mean the “face value” of all the liens rely on the
legislative history of the statute as well as the statute’s plain language. See 3 COLLIER, ¶
363.06[4][a], supra, at 363-52. These courts focus on a 1984 amendment to Section 363(f)(3)
and a plain language reading of the statute in relation to the purpose behind Section 363(f)(3).
See id.
Richardson v. Pitt County (In re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), 47 B.R. 999 (E.D.N.C. 1985), is
one of the preeminent examples of a case in which a court held that word “value” as used in
Section 363(f)(3) to mean “face value.” In re Stroud involved a debtor who was allowed to sell
property free and clear of liens, including the tax liens of Pitt County. Id. at 1001. The value of
the property was far less than the value of the liens on it, but, in the face of an objection by Pitt
County, the bankruptcy court authorized the sale free and clear of liens under Section 363(f). Id.
Pitt County appealed this judgment, and the appellate court addressed the issue of whether the
bankruptcy court’s approval of the sale of the property free and clear of liens was proper. Id.
This issue required the court to interpret Section 363(f)(3). See id. at 1001–02.
The Stroud court held that the word “value” in Section 363(f)(3) meant the “face value”
of all the liens on the property, relying predominantly on congressional intent behind the statute.
See id. The Stroud court outright rejected the trustees’ contention that the sale should be allowed
because it exceeded the economic value of the liens. See id. at 1001. The court instead relied on
the congressional intent behind the, then new, 1984 amendment to the statute. See id. The Stroud
court was particularly influenced by the fact that “Congress replaced ‘such interest’ at the end of
the sentence with ‘all liens on such property.’” Id. Thus, the Stroud court interpreted this
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amendment as an indication that Congress sought to convey its intent for word “value” in
Section 363(f)(3) to mean “face value” rather than “economic value.” See id. at 1001–1002.
The Stroud court also relied on the fact that a sale should not be authorized as free and
clear “unless the court is satisfied that the sale proceeds will fully compensate the secured
lienholders and produce some equity for the estate.” See id. at 1002. Thus, taking into account
the Congressional intent manifested by the 1984 amendment, and the traditional principles
behind sales of property free and clear of liens, the Stroud court held that the term “value” in
Section 363(f)(3) means “face value.” See id. at 1001–1002. This interpretation precluded the
sale of the property in Stroud under Section 363(f)(3), and the Stroud court went on to conclude
that the property could not be sold free and clear under Section 363(f)(3) and the other Section
363(f) subsections. See id. at 1003–04.
A more recent example of a case in which a court interpreted “value” to mean the “face
value” is Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW), 391 B.R. 25 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2008). In Clear Channel DB Burbank, LLC (DB), “held a first-priority lien on substantially all
of PW’s assets[,]” id. at 31, amounting to more than forty million dollars. Id. at 29. The Trustee
and DB reached an agreement in which DB would purchase the property for an amount equal to
its lien “if there were no qualified overbidders.” Id. at 31. Clear Channel, holding a two point
five million dollar junior lien, id. at 30, opposed the trustee’s motion “to approve the sale free
and clear of liens,” id. at 32, but the bankruptcy court, nonetheless, authorized the sale free and
clear of liens under § 363(f)(5). Id. There were no qualified overbidders, and the bankruptcy
court confirmed the sale to DB, finding the sale to be a good faith purchase. Id. Clear Channel
filed an appeal, challenging, inter alia, the authorization of the sale, free and clear of its lien and
the confirmation of the sale to DB. Id.
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The Clear Channel court interpreted “value” to mean the “face value” of all the liens
relying on the plain meaning of the statute and the purpose behind it. See id. at 40. The Clear
Channel court theorized that reading “value” to mean “economic value” would expand Section
363(f)(3) so that it would encompass nearly all bankruptcy sales, effectively allowing every sale
to be authorized free and clear of liens. See id. The court further noted that reading “value” to
mean “economic value” might make little sense in situations where the value of the property has
dropped, which, in turn, caused the economic value of the liens to also drop. See id. However,
the court noted that the value of the liens would necessarily be equal to the value of the property,
because they are no longer valued at their “face value” but rather governed by the sales price of
the property. See In re PW, 391 at 40; c.f. 3 COLLIER, ¶ 363.06[4][a], supra, at 363-52 (noting
that other courts have used similar reasoning). The court then reasoned that a situation like this
would not fall within the express language of Section 363(f)(3) which requires the property to be
sold for an amount “‘greater than’ the ‘value of all liens.’” See In re PW, 391 at 40; c.f. 3
COLLIER, ¶ 363.06[4][a], supra, at 363-52.
The Clear Channel court also noted that a broad interpretation which interprets “value”
to mean “economic value” would require a clearer congressional mandate in the form of a statute
worded in a way which clearly requires that the statute be read such that “value” means
“economic value.” See id. Not finding any congressional intent to the contrary and looking at
the purpose of the statute, the Clear Channel court found the term “value” in Section 363(f)(3) to
mean “face value.” See id. at 41. The court determined that the property could not have been sold
free and clear of any liens under any of the subsections of Section 363(f). See id. at 47.
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III. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EACH APPROACH
The consequences of the split as to the meaning of the word “value” in Section 363(f)(3)
has an effect that reaches beyond mere academic discussion. Whether a court determines the
word “value” to mean “economic value” or “face value” has real world consequences for both
debtors and creditors in Bankruptcy Courts of Equity.
A court’s decision to regard “value” as meaning “economic value” can result in real
world problems. Collier seems to suggest that “economic value” is the correct reading of
Section 363(f)(3) as it would yield a higher price at a bankruptcy sale, while still preserving a
creditor’s rights through the creditor’s ability to credit bid the value of its lien. See G COLLIER,
supra, at 44-532. Yet the court in Clear Channel raises a valid point when it questions when a
property could not be sold free and clear under Section 363(f)(3). See In re PW, 391 at 40.
Thus, what seems to result when a court defines “value” as “economic value” is a
situation which favors debtors. As long as a debtor is able to sell the property above its market
value, he or she will be able to sell the property free and clear of any liens. See id. The creditor’s
recourse is to credit bid the value of its lien which would cause it to take possession of the land
rather than receiving cash for the value of its lien. See G COLLIER, supra, at 44-532. While this
seems to be an equitable resolution, the result of Clear Channel is illustrative of the inequity
which can result to a creditor. There, DB was able to credit bid the value of its lien, effectively
depriving Clear Channel of the same recourse. See In re PW, 391 at 31–32. While having the
ability to credit bid the value of a creditor’s lien may, at first blush, sound like a valid recourse,
one must remember that only one creditor has the ability to do this, resulting in a somewhat
inequitable situation for other lien holders if the value of the property is depressed. See, e.g., id.
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Interpreting “value” to mean “face value” can also result in a number of real world
problems. As Collier recognizes, a property which cannot be sold free and clear of liens may be
difficult to sell at all, and if the property does sell, it will be at a much lower price. See G
COLLIER, supra, at 44-530–31. This unfortunate situation can come to fruition when a piece of
property cannot satisfy the face value of all the liens on it, and one lien holder can withhold
consent to and block what would otherwise be a valid sale. See In re Terrace Gardens Park
Partnership, 96 B.R. 707, 712 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.1989); G COLLIER, supra, at 44-530–31. While
the property still has the ability to be sold, it is not likely to garner the same price as if it had it
been sold free and clear of liens at a bankruptcy sale. See G COLLIER, supra, at 44-529.
Thus, what seems to be created when a court defines “value” as “face value” is an
inequitable situation where no player in the bankruptcy system benefits. A debtor or trustee
would not benefit from this reading of Section 363(f)(3) as it would be more difficult to sell a
piece of property. See id., at 44-530–31. The majority of creditors are unlikely to benefit as well.
When a property sells at a low price, the entire pool of money which creditors may recover in a
bankruptcy shrinks. See id. at 44-531. With less money available, these creditors will recover
even less from a debtor. See id. Being that the property is usually one of the major assets of the
debtor, see, e.g., In re PW, 391 at 31, this could mean that many creditors may walk away from a
bankruptcy only marginally compensated. Thus, interpreting “value” to mean “face value” has
far reaching effects throughout the bankruptcy system which touches almost all the parties
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.
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CONCLUSION
There is a sharp split among courts when interpreting the word “value” in Section
363(f)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Both sides of the split have well-reasoned arguments with
some courts relying on the statutory context of Section 363(f)(3), and others relying on the
congressional intent behind the enactment of Section 363(f)(3). Whatever a court’s rationale, it
is also evident that the way a court interprets the word “value” in Section 363(f)(3) can result in
real world consequences for debtors and creditors. With the threat of these consequences and the
fact that the sharp split in courts does not seem likely to be resolved in the near future,
bankruptcy attorneys should be vigilant in ascertaining the law in their jurisdiction and
protecting the rights of their client accordingly.
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